Review of \u3cem\u3eKill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam by Daddis, Gregory A.
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
History Faculty Articles and Research History
7-2013
Review of Kill Anything That Moves: The Real
American War in Vietnam
Gregory A. Daddis
Chapman University, daddis@chapman.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/history_articles
Part of the Asian History Commons, Cultural History Commons, Diplomatic History
Commons, Military History Commons, Other History Commons, Political History Commons,
Public History Commons, Social History Commons, and the United States History Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the History at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in History Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daddis, Gregory A. Review of Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam, by Nick Turse. Journal of Military History
77, no. 3 ( July 2013): 1174-1176.
Review of Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam
Comments
This review was originally published in Journal of Military History, volume 77, issue 3, in 2013.
Copyright
Society for Military History
This book review is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/history_articles/60
Book Reviews 
pe1rsonn1el in the same chain of command. this achievement the 
substantive returns on this investment were not sufficient to bring victory' and 
remain open to question today. 
For the rest of his public service, essentially a four-year stint in Harold Brown's 
Department of Defense, Komer dealt with major problems in the same way he had 
in Vietnam. Working on NATO questions as Special Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense, and then on the Middle East and on Central Asia problems as Undersec-
retary for Policy, he met with generally positive but often mixed results. 
In the out of office and never to return, Komer reflected once more 
on the Vietnam concluding that the best approach to winning would have 
been to sooner and with more resources apply his nation-building, winning-the-
hearts-and-minds, pacification/counterinsurgency approach. Komer also faced the 
question of the United States failed to win. The reasons were many on both 
the American and South Vietnamese sides but the heart of the matter, Jones tells 
us, was the weakness of the American ally, South Vietnam--a nation led by vacil-
politicians and incompetent generals and, because it had time to be no other, 
a political construct without roots or organic life. 
Though Jones mentions it he does not emphasize the possible deleterious 
impact of Komer's personality on his work. Nicknamed "Blowtorch Bob," Komer, 
throughout his years of public service, exhibited to one and all administrative abra-
siveness and intellectual arrogance, characteristics typical of what might be called 
the difficult person syndrome. Simply put, the difficult person, although smart and 
Ca.J_•~Hc...,u, achieves less than expected, or achieves nothing at all, because his or her 
above mentioned qualities have offended the very people whose cooperation or 
assistance is crucial for achievement. (Other examples might be James Schlesinger 
at Defense, Richard Holbrooke at State, and Susan Rice at the United Nations.) 
The above notwithstanding, Jones has succeeded in the task he set himsel£ 
We now know that Komer, not just during the Vietnam War but later in Carter's 
LJ(~pa.rtr11e11t of Defense, acted as very few had - as a master strategist who under-
stood the national interest and how to develop means to achieve it within the limits 
of resources and reality. To convey this sophisticated, complex story to readers is no 
mean feat and Jones has done it admirably. 
Carland Annandale, Virginia 
Kil/Anything That Moves: The RealAmerican Jf.ilrin Vietnam. By NickTurse. New 
York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt Co., 2013. ISBN 978-0-8050-8691-1. 
Illustrations. Notes. Index. Pp. 370. $35.00. 
In the Vietnam War constructed by investigative journalist Nick Turse, nearly 
every American soldier was a remorseless killing machine wielding unlimited :fire-
power against a hapless civilian population. Violence, murder, and civilian suffering 
were the norm, war crimes a natural outgrowth of US command policies. In short, 
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this work puts the carnage of war center stage. T urse has done valuable service in 
his readers to consider violence against noncombatants in while 
challenging postwar narratives which portray atrocities like the Lai massacre as 
an aberration. For its subject matter alone, this is a taxing read. 
Relying on the records of the Army's Vietnam War Crimes Working Group, 
and supplementing his research with interviews of US veterans and Vietnamese 
Turse aims to demonstrate how atrocities became routine for Americans 
fighting in Vietnam. A constant emphasis on body counts permitted young soldiers 
to unleash destructive impulses far beyond the scope of behavior. T urse 
thus moves from one brutality to the next in workmanlike fashion-the killing of 
unarmed civilians, the burning of hamlets, the sexual exploitation of women, and 
the purposeful generation of refugees. So debased had Americans become that 
"Gang rapes were a horrifyingly common occurrence" (p. 168). Worse, U.S. officials 
at the highest levels suppressed evidence of these atrocities to combat allegations 
that criminality had become the norm. 
Qyestioning the conduct of armies in war is a legitimate endeavor, as is 
focusing one's historical lens on the civilian population. Too many American 
accounts of Vietnam lose sight of the very object of a "people's war." In hoping 
correct this error, Turse underscores the unnerving state of existence in which 
local villagers faced unpredictable foreigners armed with modern, lethal weapons. 
"At every turn, the onus was put on Vietnamese civilians to actively demonstrate 
that they were indeed noncombatants" (p. 55). For a population Americans were 
supposed to be protecting, such relationships clearly worked against larger US 
goals in South Vietnam. 
Unfortunately, Turse's laudable aim of bringing civilian anguish to the fore is 
undermined by significant methodological shortcomings. The author loses sight of 
the political and military context of the war, likely because of his single-minded 
exploitation of the War Crimes Working Group files. Turse highlights American 
transgressions in Binh Dinh province, for instance, without acknowledging its role 
as a revolutionary stronghold. This is not meant to excuse atrocities but the reader 
is left without any understanding of why US forces were conducting operations in 
Binh Dinh or the difficulties posed by an elusive, intelligent, and equally violent 
enemy. In this story, the Vietnamese are little more than victims. Moreover, Turse 
evaluates none of the vital non-military programs and neglects the role of those 
Americans involved in civic action. Even if violence eroded their moral principles, 
not all soldiers were involved in "industrial-scale slaughter" (p. 204). 
Turse's accounting thus raises questions about using a narrow body of evidence 
to make broader generalizations about one of America's longest wars. While he 
substantiates the horrific acts performed by some US soldiers and marines, Turse 
sees in his research acts representative of American behavior writ large. Discounted 
are the voices of countless Americans who genuinely believed-based on experi-
ence and doctrine-that protecting the population offered the surest path to a 
stable, independent South Vietnam. 
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Civilian is a serious and most understudied aspect of the 
Vietnam War that merits discussion. We should do so in a way, however, that values 
the Vietnamese population as more than just "collateral damage," while at the same 
time allowing for the possibility that not all American soldiers were bent on laying 
waste to the South Vietnamese countryside and its people. 
Gregory A. Daddis U.S. Military Academy 
West Point, New York 
